Gender Wage Gaps across Skills and Trade Openness by Ben Yahmed, Sarra
Gender Wage Gaps across Skills and Trade Openness
Sarra Ben Yahmed
To cite this version:
Sarra Ben Yahmed. Gender Wage Gaps across Skills and Trade Openness. 2012. <halshs-
00793559>
HAL Id: halshs-00793559
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00793559
Submitted on 22 Feb 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2012 - Nr 32
Gender Wage Gaps across Skills and Trade Openness 
 
Sarra Ben Yahmed
Gender Wage Gaps across Skills
and Trade Openness
Sarra Ben Yahmed∗
November 2012
Keywords: Gender Wage Gap, Statistical Discrimination, Trade Openness, Technol-
ogy Upgrading.
JEL codes: J24, J7, F16.
Abstract
Several empirical studies have shown that the effect of openness on the gender wage
gap depends on the skill requirement of the workplace. This paper offers a theoretical
explanation to understand that finding.
We integrate a statistical discrimination framework with the labour assignment ap-
proach to give general conditions under which the matching between firms and workers
gives rise to a wider gender wage gap at the upper tail of the distribution, in accor-
dance with empirical evidence. We further look at the effect of trade openness on
the gender wage gap along the entire distribution. Workers’ characteristics vary in
two dimensions, skills and job commitment. The inability to observe individual’s job
commitment induces employers to base partly their decision on group average. Fol-
lowing the literature on labour and international trade, we assume that skills act as
complements to technological upgrading. Exporting firms are more skill-intensive and
pay higher wages ; assuming further that worker’s job commitment is a complement
to technological upgrading, we find that a reduction in trade costs increases wage
inequality within-groups and has non-monotonic effects on between-group inequality.
Trade openness reduces the gender wage gap among unskilled workers but increases
the gender wage gap among high-skill workers.
∗Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS. email: sarra.ben-
yahmed@univ-amu.fr
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have shown that the effect of openness on both the gender
wage gap and the employment gap depends on the skill requirement of the job. Open-
ness improves women’s access to paid employment and thus increases total female wage
earnings in an economy, but those gains are concentrated in low-skill low-wage jobs within
industries (see Ozler (2000), Ederington et al. (2009), Fafchamps (2009), Fafchamps et al.
(2009), Juhn et al. (2012) which we discuss below). Despite a strong empirical interest,
the channels of impact underlying this pattern have not been formalized. This paper
seeks to offer an explanation for this phenomenon by relating skill-biased investments fos-
tered by trade openness with discriminating behaviors that depend on jobs’ characteristics.
It is now well known that trade openness affects workers differently along the skill
distribution ; the skill premium is found to increase with trade exposure in both developed
and developing countries1. At the same time, evidence on several countries shows that
the adjusted gender wage gap is higher in the upper part of the wage distribution2. This
pattern can be explained by three phenomenon. First, women are less often promoted to
top jobs, the glass-ceiling effect. Second, within jobs, women are paid less than their male
counterpart, especially in high-responsibility high-wage jobs. Moreover, wage dispersion
across firms explains a large portion of the variation in individuals’ wages, in particular
between men and women. There is evidence showing that the sorting of women into
low-wage firms, a glass-door effect, accounts for part of the higher adjusted wage gaps at
the top of distribution3. Given that gender discrimination is stronger at the top of the
wage distribution and that trade openness tends to exacerbate wage inequality, one would
expect a widening of the gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution following
1Empirical assessments of the impact of trade openness on wage inequality are for instance, Bernard &
Jensen (1997) on the US, Pavcnik et al. (2004) on Brazil, Brambilla et al. (2011) on several Latin-American
countries. See also Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007) for a literature review. Theoretical models that explain
how trade increases the skill-premium are Neary (2003), Yeaple (2005), Bustos (2011) and Sampson (2012)
among others.
2Recent examples in this literature include Nopo et al. (2010) for Latin American countries, de la Rica
et al. (2008) for Spain and Albrecht et al. (2009) for the Netherlands.
3Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) show that segregation into low-wage occupations and low-wage estab-
lishments explain part of the wage gap in Sweden while Amuedo-Dorantes & De la Rica (2006) come to
similar conclusion for Spain. Javdani (2012) applies the methodology of Pendakur & Woodcock (2010) on
Canadian data to decompose the gender wage gaps along the distribution into a within-firm glass-ceiling
effect and a glass-door effect i.e. the under-representation of women in high-wage firms.
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trade liberalization. This paper provides a description of the mechanism and the conditions
under which trade openness leads to a reduction of the gender wage gap at the bottom of
the distribution and an increase of the gap at the top.
Closely related to this paper, a few empirical studies have pointed out the heteroge-
neous effects of trade on the relative position of women depending on the skill requirement
of the workplace. Joekes (1995) highlights that the expansion of the export manufacturing
sectors in Morocco and Bangladesh created new sources of employment for women but in
unskilled occupations, mainly in the textile and clothing industries. This result is confirmed
by Fafchamps (2009) who finds that Moroccan exporters, concentrated in light industries
such as textile and apparel where the workforce is mainly unskilled, employ significantly
more women and pay them on average lower wages controlling for education. Ozler (2000)
uses plant-level data from Turkey and shows that trade liberalization in the 1980s led to
employment gains for women relative to men in the manufacturing sector. However, women
continued to be employed in low-skill and low-pay jobs within plants. Furthermore, among
plants with a high female share, as well as among large establishments, investments in ma-
chinery and equipment brought about a decline in the female share of employment. This
finding supports the argument that employment gains for women following trade liberal-
ization might be reversed as a consequence of technological upgrading. Ederington et al.
(2009) use plant-level data for Columbia to study changes in employment within firms over
the period 1985-1991. They show that plants that have the highest female share of employ-
ment are less intensive in capital and pay lower wages compare to the industry average. As
for the role of openness, the share of exports in the plant’s total production is positively
associated with the plant’s female share which implies that openness can be good for fe-
male employment opportunities. In the same direction, a reduction in tariffs has a positive
effect on plants’ female share of employment. However, when they distinguish between
the share of female among skilled workers and among unskilled workers, they uncover that
those employment gains benefit mostly unskilled women while trade openness has been
detrimental to skilled women. Indeed, an increase in the plant’s export share reduces the
female share of skilled workers. As for a reduction in tariffs, it increases the demand for
unskilled female labour but not the demand for skilled women among exporting plants,
while it increases the demand for both types of female labour among non-exporting plants.
Juhn et al. (2012) use plant-level data for Mexico to examine changes in gender wage and
employment gaps. The results indicate that tariff reductions following the North American
Free Trade Agreement increased the employment and wage bill share of women in unskilled
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occupations but not among skilled workers. Implementing a two stage empirical strategy,
they show that trade openness affects gender inequalities by increasing firms’ incentives to
invest in new machinery equipment. Klein et al. (2010) evaluate the contribution of firms’
trade orientation to wage inequality across and within male and female groups of workers
for the German manufacturing industries between 1993 and 2007. They find that women
face a wage penalty compare to men and that this penalty is increasing with the skill level.
The wage gap is smaller in exporting plants for low-skilled individuals but not for college
educated individuals. They additionally find that the export-wage premium is increasing
with the skill level of the individual within groups. To sum up, trade openness contributes
to wage dispersion among men and among women, but the effect on the wage gap depends
on the skill level of the workers. Finally, Oostendorp (2004) looks at the impact of sectoral
trade shares on the gender wage gap within narrowly defined occupations for more than
80 countries. Exploiting the changes in trade intensity within a given occupation-sector-
country cell over time, he finds that an increase in the sectoral trade share narrows the
occupational wage gap for unskilled labour only and the occupational gender wage gap is
lower in unskilled occupations compare to skilled occupations, the difference being bigger
in developing countries.
This paper offers a theoretical explanation for the finding that trade affects the gen-
der wage gap differently across the skill distribution. The model features two groups of
workers, men and women, whose characteristics vary in two dimensions, skills and job com-
mitment which corresponds to workers’ availability and willingness to maintain a long and
continuous working life. We assume that men and women have the same skill distribution
that is perfectly observable. However, commitment is unobservable by the employer which
generates statistical discrimination. In particular, employers discriminate against women
because they have on average a lower labour market commitment4. As employers pay
worker-specific wages, a woman is hired at a lower wage compared to a man with identical
skills to compensate for the potential loss in case of lower commitment. This setting has
been inspired by Lazear & Rosen (1990) dynamic model of statistical discrimination where
women face a lower promotion probability along the job ladder of a given firm because
of learning in top jobs and a lower propensity for women to remain on the job. In our
4Gender differences in labour market commitment stems from work interruptions typically due to ma-
ternity leave and child rearing. It also includes the impossibility to work overtime as well as lower energy
on the job due to greater time spent on housework and childcare
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model, workers are sorted across firms rather than types of jobs ; moreover, the matching
is not determined by learning but by technology differences that result from firms’ endoge-
nous investment decisions. Firms make a simultaneous decision on technology investment
and hiring as in Yeaple (2005). They calculate the expected workers productivity condi-
tional on the technology, their observation of worker’s skills and their expectation about
the worker’s degree of commitment. We assume that high-skill workers are more produc-
tive than low-skill workers (absolute advantage) but they are more so in high-technology
firms (comparative advantage). Similarly, strongly committed workers are always more
productive than less-committed workers (absolute advantage) but they are more so in
high-technology firms (comparative advantage).
The model gives the sorting of men and women across firms and the wage gap distri-
bution in a closed economy setting. The most skilled workers are employed in the high-
technology firms where the skill reward and the expected commitment reward are higher.
Yet, to enter a high-technology firm, women need to have a higher skill level than men to
compensate for the uncertainty on their level of commitment. This leads to higher gender
wage gaps in the upper part of the distributions which fits within-country evidence.
We then shed light on the implications of international trade for the gender wage gap
in the presence of such heterogeneity. We consider a monopolistic competition framework
(Krugman (1980)) where two identical countries trade different varieties of a differentiated
good. Trade is costly, generating both fixed and variable costs, so that only the most
productive firms that use the high-technology engage in exporting along the lines of Melitz
(2003). A reduction in trade costs spurs firms to adopt the high-technology to benefit from
export revenues which increases the demand for skilled workers and strongly committed
workers. We find that trade liberalization increases the gender wage gap in the upper tail
of the distribution as it induces more firms to adopt skill-intensive production technologies
where job commitment acts as a strategic complement. However, the effect on the mean
gender wage gap is ambiguous.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to a large body
of work dealing with how trade openness, associated with firm heterogeneity, influences
wage inequalities. In much of this literature, exporters differ from non-exporters as they
are bigger, more productive, more skill-intensive and pay higher wages5. This work is also
5See the influential paper by Bernard & Jensen (1997) for evidence on the exporter wage premium and
skill-biased shift in labour demand in U.S. manufacturing during the 1980s. Bustos (2011) gives evidence
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related to recent trade models using labour assignment to provide insights about the impact
of globalization on the labour markets (see for example Yeaple (2005), Ohnsorge & Trefler
(2007), Costinot & Vogel (2010)). The novelty of the present paper is to introduce another
dimension in worker heterogeneity that is unobservable to the firm and leads employer to
discriminate on the basis of the average characteristic of the group the worker belongs to.
We show that the wage dispersion induced by trade occurs both within gender groups,
along the skill level, and between gender groups, generating changes in the gender wage
gap adjusted for observable skills.
In this way, the paper also contributes to the literature that deals with the effect of the
overall wage structure on the wage gaps across groups such as men and women by taking
into account the effect of trade openness6.
This work is also related to the literature on gender discrimination in the labour market
and in particular to the papers studying the effect of trade openness on the adjusted gender
wage gap. Most of those studies have focused on the competition effect of international
trade in a setting with taste-based discrimination (see ?, Black & Brainerd (2004), Menon
& van der Meulen Rodgers (2009) among others for empirical appraisals of the foreign
competition effect, as well as Ederington et al. (2009) and Ben Yahmed (2012) for both
empirical and theoretical analysis). The present study focuses on a channel different from
the competition channel coupled with taste-based discrimination. It focuses on the chan-
nel of biased technological change induced by trade openness in a setting with statistical
discrimination. One related paper is the one by Juhn et al. (2012) who provide an expla-
nation for narrowing gender wage gaps among blue-collars but not among white-collars,
a pattern they observe in Mexico in the aftermath of the NAFTA. They assume that the
new technology reduces the need for physical strength in blue collar occupations so that
the relative demand for female labour increases in those occupations. We depart from their
setting by proposing a model with worker heterogeneity in two dimensions, an observable
characteristic distributed equally among men and women, and an unobservable character-
istic unequally distributed. Differences in expected productivity arise endogenously from
the matching of firms and workers. This paper gives general conditions on the production
technology under which we can generate non-monotonic effects of trade on gender inequal-
based on Argentinian firm data that corroborates her theoretical predictions: by increasing potential ex-
port revenues and making costly investment worthy, reduction in trade costs favours investment in new
technologies which increases the demand for skilled workers.
6The wage structure is the values the labour market attaches to skills and other productive character-
istics. For studies of the US labour market, see Blau and Kahn (1992, 1994, 2003)
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ities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the setup of the
model. Section 3 provides the equilibrium in a closed economy where the distribution the
gender wage gap across fits within-country evidence. In section 4, we characterize the
open economy equilibrium and derive the implications of international trade and further
reductions in trading costs for the distribution of the gender wage gap. The final section
concludes.
2 Setup of the model
2.1 Demand
Preferences are identical across all consumers who choose a quantity of a homogeneous
good and a quantity of varieties of a differentiated good. The utility function is Cobb
Douglas between the differentiated good X and the homogeneous good Y and presents
a CES sub-utility over the varieties i of X. This function expresses a love of variety of
consumers. Then
U = Y 1−βXβ
X =
(
N∑
i
xαi
) 1
α
where the elasticity of substitution across varieties of X is given by σ = 11−α . The price
index of the differentiated good X is : PX =
(∑
i p
1−σ
i
) 1
1−σ . If all prices are equal, the
price index is PX = pN
1
1−σ . It decreases with N the number of varieties produced and the
elasticity of substitution σ. Consumers choose the share of their incomeM they will devote
to the differentiated good by maximizing their utility subject to their revenue constraint.
The price of the homogeneous good is normalized to one.
X = (βM)/PX
Y = (1− β)M (1)
Let us note E = βM is the portion of income spent on the differentiated good. Con-
sumers decide also how much of each variety they consume. As they value diversity, they
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consume a positive amount of each symmetric variety and spend the same amount on each
variety :
xi =
E
PX
(
pi
PX
)−σ
(2)
The demand for variety i takes into account the average price of good X. The term
E
PX
corresponds to the aggregate demand for X while the price differential piPX models the
competition effect between variety i and the other varieties.
2.2 Worker heterogeneity in observable and unobservable characteristics
The workforce is heterogeneous in both skills and job commitment. There is a con-
tinuum of skills s distributed among the population according to a distribution function
L over the support [0; s¯]. L(s) is the inelastic supply of labour with skill no greater
than s. We assume that men and women have the same exogenous skill distribution
Lf (s) = Lm(s) = L(s). The mass of workers per group is normalized to one. As for the
differences in job commitment, let us assume that there are two types of individuals, the
highly-committed that spend the maximum time and effort in the firm over the period
e = e¯ and the low-committed ones for which e = e 7. We simplify the model by assuming
that men always demonstrate a high level of commitment Prm(e = e¯) = 1 while women
have a probability to favour labour market activity over their domestic activities equal to
Prf (e = e¯) = η with 0 < η < 1 8. There is no correlation between s and e which means
that the probability of being highly committed to one’s job is independent of one’s skill
level9.
The skill of a worker can be perfectly observed by the employers however the level of job
commitment is unobservable : employers cannot anticipate the time and energy a worker is
7In sociology, the preference theory developed in Hakim (2000) argues that differences in women’s
preferences for combination of domestic activities and paid employment explain differences in labour market
attachment among women. She sorts women in three categories: home-centered, adaptative and work-
centered. Only women belonging to the last two categories participate to the labour market. We model
the difference between these two groups by an exogenous difference in job commitment.
8This amounts to a normalization of male probability of commitment. We actually just need that men
are more likely to prefer work-centered lifestyles and thus have a higher probability to be highly committed.
9Skill investment is exogenous in this model. Our results will hold if we allow for a correlation between
skills and commitment sufficiently low compare to the degree of complementarity in the production function
as we will see below
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going to put in the job. Even though employers expect some women to be highly commit-
ted, they are unable to know which ones prior hiring. As a consequence, employers uses the
average female labour market attachment to make expectation about female productivity.
Labour productivity is increasing with both s and e and depends also on the technology j
in use, as we will see in the next sub-section.
2.3 Production
The productivity of a worker endowed with skills of level s and a level of commitment
e when working with technology j is noted ϕj(s, e). Because employers cannot observe e,
they form expectations based on the observable, the skill and the sex of the worker. We
note ϕ˜jg(s) the expected productivity of a worker with skill s from group g as viewed by
the employer prior hiring when technology j is used. As men’s productivity is perfectly
observable, ϕ˜jm(s) = ϕj(s, e¯). As for women’s productivity, employers form identical
expectations given by: ϕ˜jf (s) = E(ϕj(s, e)|η) = ηϕj(s, e¯) + (1 − η)ϕj(s, e). Employers
anticipate different productivities for a man and a woman endowed with the same skill
level and working with the same technology : ϕ˜jm(s) > ϕ˜jf (s) ∀j ∈ {l, h} and ∀s ∈]0; s¯].
In sector Y, the homogeneous good, firms produce under constant returns to scale and
perfect competition using labour only. We assume that labour productivity does not de-
pend on either workers’ skills or effort in this sector and we set ϕY = 1. We note cY the
unit cost of production equal to the wage per efficient unit of labour : cY = wYϕY . Under
perfect competition in both product and labour markets, firms set prices equal to their unit
cost of production pY = wYϕY . We choose sector Y as the numeraire pY = 1, consequently
we have cY = wY = ϕY = 1.
In sector X, the differentiated good sector, firms operate under imperfect competition
and increasing returns to scale. We assume that the sector is characterized by horizontal
product differentiation and monopolistic competition where N firms produce each a variety
of the differentiated product. Firms have to pay a fixed investment cost to produce one
variety. This innovation cost F acts as an entry barrier which ensures that each variety
is produced by only one firm. As varieties are not perfect substitutes, firms enjoy some
market power that enable them to make positive operating profits and pay the fixed cost.
After choosing its technology, the firm can produce a variety of good X hiring labour; we
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differentiate male labour m and female labour f . The following assumptions characterize
the technology and the productivity function.
Assumption A1. Fixed and variable costs
Firms can invest in two different technologies indexed by j = {l, h}. To acquire the the
high-technology firms bear a higher fixed cost Fh > Fl but benefit from a higher productivity
of labour for a given skill level and commitment, ϕh(s, e) > ϕl(s, e). If a worker has no
skill, s = 0, his/her productivity is the same in sector X and Y : ϕh(0, e) = ϕl(0, e) = 1.
Firms choose the type of investment they make considering both its cost and the re-
sulting gain in productivity. This specification is consistent with R&D being positively
correlated with firm productivity (Klette & Kortum (2004) for example).
Assumption A2. Log-supermodularity in skills and technology
Skills acts as a strategic complement to technology upgrading:
ϕh(s′, e)
ϕh(s, e)
>
ϕl(s′, e)
ϕl(s, e)
for any s′ > s ∀e
The productivity gain derived from hiring a worker with a higher skill is greater un-
der technology h. This means that workers with higher skill levels have a comparative
advantage in the sophisticated technology.
Assumption A3. Log-supermodularity in commitment and technology
Job commitment and technology upgrading are complementary:
ϕh(s, e¯)
ϕh(s, e)
>
ϕl(s, e¯)
ϕl(s, e)
for any e¯ > e ∀s
This means that strongly committed workers have a comparative advantage in the high
technology.
Assumption A4. Log-supermodularity in skills and commitment
Job commitment and skills are complementary:
ϕj(s′, e¯)
ϕj(s, e¯)
>
ϕj(s′, e)
ϕj(s, e)
for any e¯ > e and s′ > s ∀j = {l, h}
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A high skill level is more valuable when the worker’s job commitment is high.
Assumptions A2 to A4 requires the productivity function to be non separable in s, e
and j.
We further assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive and that employers
are risk-neutral. Workers bear no search cost and wages are flexible. Firms take the
wage rate per efficiency unit of labour as given. Writing c˜j the expected unit cost under
technology j, firms set worker-specific wages in accordance with the expected productivity
of each worker wg(s) = c˜jϕ˜jg(s).
3 The closed economy Equilibrium
3.1 Profit maximization under monopolistic competition
Firms operating with the same technology are symmetric, in particular they have the
same expected productivity for a given worker of skill s and sex g, that we note ϕ˜jg.
Consequently the expected unit cost c˜j is identical across firms of identical technologies.
As a result, the technology j = {h, l} specifies all relevant firm’s variable. We can thus
solve firms’ problem in sector X using two representative firms h and l. Total production
cost for a firm j can be written as :
TCj =
1
Nj
∑
g
(∫
s∈Sjg
wjg(s)l(s)ds
)
where Sjg is the set of skills of workers belonging to group g employed by a firm of type j.
Nj is the endogenous number of j-firms. Effective labour is used to produce qj quantity of
good X to be sold and to pay the fixed cost :
qj + Fj =
1
Nj
∑
g
(∫
s∈Sj
ϕ(s)l(s)ds
)
We denote by c˜j the expected cost per efficient unit of labour under technology j,
c˜j = wg(s)ϕ˜jg(s) . The profit of a firm using technology j can written :
pij = pjqj − cj(qj + Fj)
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Firms maximize their expected profits with respect to quantities10.
pij = maxqj{pjqj − c˜j(qj + Fj)}
The first-order condition for equilibrium is :
pj =
σ
σ − 1 c˜j (3)
Under competitive labour markets and monopolistic competition, firms with tech-
nology j hire workers up to the point where the wage per efficiency unit of labour,
c˜j = wj(s, η)/ϕj(s, η), equals the marginal revenue product pj σ−1σ . Hence, employees
working with the same technology are paid the same fraction of their respective expected
productivity:
wjg(s) = pj
σ − 1
σ
ϕ˜jg(s)
with 0 < σ−1σ < 1.
3.2 The wage distribution for men and women
We follow Yeaple (2005) where workers with different skills sort across h and l type
firms. In this paper, workers not only differ in their observable skill s but also in their
unobservable degree of job commitment e. Following the literature on job assignment, we
assume that workers know the wage they can earn if they are matched to a given firm j
and go to the firm that offers the highest wage.
Proposition 1. Sorting of workers
If higher skill workers have a comparative advantage in h-type firms then h-type firms hire
the most skilled workers of each group g
We prove this result in the appendix by showing that if positive assortative matching is
not followed, the value of the output and wages can increase by switching the assignment
of workers to firms 11. This self-selection process implies that within each group there is
a marginal worker who is indifferent between working in a low-tech firm or a high-tech firm.
10Under monopolistic competition without any strategic interactions, competition on prices or on quan-
tities lead to the same equilibrium result.
11This sorting mechanism has been first suggested by Roy (1951) where workers self-select into the
occupation that gives them the highest expected earnings.
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The wage distribution for men and women is given by the function wjg(s) = c˜j .ϕ˜jg(s)
where the wage of a worker is equal to the cost per unit of efficient labour times the expected
productivity of the worker. We can give an expression for the wage that depends on firms’
technologies and the skill thresholds sjg below which a worker from group g = {f,m} is
not hired by a firm j = {l, h}.
wg(s) =

cY ϕY = 1 if s < slg
c˜lϕ˜lg(s) if slg ≤ s < shg
c˜hϕ˜hg(s) if shg ≤ s
(4)
Among each group g = {m, f}, workers with a skill level equal to the threshold slg is
indifferent between working in sector Y and working in a firm l in sector X. Similarly a
worker with a skill level shg is indifferent between working in a firm using either technology
h or l : c˜lϕ˜lg(shg) = c˜hϕ˜hg(shg). Consequently, we can rank the unit cost of production :
c˜l
cY
= ϕY (slg)
ϕ˜lg(slg)
= 1
ϕ˜lg(slg)
< 1 and c˜h
c˜l
= ϕ˜lg(shg)
ϕ˜hg(shg)
< 1 (5)
Firms in the diversified sector have lower unit cost of production than firms in sector
Y. Within sector X, firms using the low technology have higher unit cost than firms using
the high technology.
Using the indifference condition for both groups, we can rank the skill threshold required
to men and women.
ϕY (slf )
ϕ˜lf (slf )
= ϕY (slm)
ϕ˜lg(slm)
⇔ 1
ϕ˜lf (slf )
= 1
ϕ˜lm(slm)
and
ϕ˜lm(shm)
ϕ˜hm(shm)
= ϕ˜lf (shf )
ϕ˜hf (shf )
⇔ ϕ˜hf (shf )
ϕ˜hm(shm)
= ϕ˜lf (shf )
ϕ˜lm(shm)
Using these two equations, we can state the following proposition :
Proposition 2. Ranking of male and female skill requirements
i) sjf is a function of sjm and η
ii) Given that Prf (e = e¯) < Prm(e = e¯) and ϕl is increasing in e, employers using the
technology l require from women a higher skill level slf > slm
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iii) Under the assumptions A2 and A3, the skill threshold to work for a firm h is higher
for women shf > shm
The proof is developed in the appendix.
Consequently, a woman working in sector Y can have a greater skill level than a man
working in a firm l; this holds for workers with skills comprised between the male and
female threshold for entering sector X, slm ≤ s ≤ slf . Similarly, a female worker employed
in a firm l can have a greater skill level than a men working in a firm h; this holds for
workers with skills comprised between the male and female threshold for entering a firm
h, shm ≤ s ≤ shf .
We can now describe the wage distribution for both men and women. The slope of the
wage profile becomes steeper at each group-specific skill threshold slg and shg because the
technology l enhances worker productivity compare to the technology used in sector Y and
the technology h features stronger skill complementarity than the technology l. Within
group, the skill of any worker using the technology l is lower than the skill of a worker
using the technology h.
We can further give the distribution of the wage gap along the skill distribution where
WG(s) = wm(s)wf (s) is the gap between a man and a woman of skill s.
WG(s) =

1 if s ≤ slm
c˜l
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕY
if slm ≤ s ≤ slf
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if slf ≤ s ≤ shm
c˜h
c˜l
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if shm ≤ s ≤ shf
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜hf (s) if shf ≤ s
Proposition 3. Under assumptions A1, A2 and A4, the gender wage gap is increasing in
the skill level.
We give here an overview of the proof provided in the appendix. The assumption on the
complementarity between skills and technology (A2) ensures that the gender wage gap is
increasing in s when men and women work with different technologies while the assumption
on the complementarity between skills and commitment (A4) ensures that the gender wage
gap is increasing in s even for men and women hired by firms with identical technologies.
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Figure 1: The wage distribution for men and women
3.3 Free entry and market clearing
Investment in technology is unrestricted so that the number of firms adjusts until profits
using either technology are zero. For each type of technology, the unit cost under which
total revenues equal total (labour) costs is :
c˜j =
σ
σ − 1P
σ−1
σ
X
(
E(σ − 1)
Fj
) 1
σ
(6)
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The different fixed costs generate two productivity cutoffs. Producing with the technol-
ogy h requires a higher productivity c˜h < c˜l to be able to make higher operating profits to
pay for the higher fixed cost. Firms make their investment and human resources decisions
jointly as the unit cost of producing with a given technology depends on the skill level of
the workforce.
Relating the zero profit conditions for both types of firms, we obtain:
ϕ˜hg(shg)
ϕ˜lg(shg)
=
(
Fh
Fl
) 1
σ
(7)
This pins down the skill threshold to enter a firm h for both men and women as a
function of the technologies’ parameters. An increase in the fixed cost to invest in the high
technology increase the skill threshold required to workers.
Female and male total labour supply is assumed to be fixed and is divided across the
tree types of firms.
The numbers of high-technology and low-technology firms in sector X are given by :
Nh(qh + Fh) =
∫
s∈Shf
ϕ˜hf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Shm
ϕ˜hm(s)l(s)ds
Nl(ql + Fl) =
∫
s∈Slf
ϕ˜lf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Slm
ϕ˜lm(s)l(s)ds
Using the free entry condition :
Nh =
1
σFh
(
∫
s∈Shf
ϕ˜hf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Shm
ϕ˜hm(s)l(s)ds) (8)
Nl =
1
σFl
(
∫
s∈Slf
ϕ˜lf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Slm
ϕ˜lm(s)l(s)ds) (9)
The number of firm j depends on the four skill thresholds sjg with j = {h, l} and
g = {m, f}.
The threshold shm is pined down by the free entry condition in sector X while the sorting
of workers across the two types of firms relates shm to shf . The market clearing condition
for good Y determines the skill threshold slm.
To close the model, we finally use the market clearing condition in sector Y where the
level of production is Y = ∑g ∫ slg0 l(s)ds.
The demand for good Y, given by the Cobb-Douglas preferences, must equal the production
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of the good. Since Y is the numeraire pY = 1, the market clearing condition is :
Y = (1− β)M
where M is total revenue which equals total wages (firms make no positive profits in
equilibrium) : M = ∑g(∫s∈SY g l(s)ds + ∫s∈Slg wlg(s)l(s)ds + ∫s∈Shg whg(s)l(s)ds). Con-
sumption of good Y is a function of the cost thresholds slg and shg.
Using equations (13) and (5), replacing M in the equation for the demand of good Y
and equalizing demand and production for good Y we obtain :
β
1− β ϕ˜l(slm)
∑
g
∫ slg
0
l(s)ds =
∑
g
(∫ shg
slg
ϕ˜lg(s)l(s)ds+
ϕ˜l(shm)
ϕ˜h(shm)
∫ s¯
shg
ϕ˜hg(s)l(s)ds
)
(10)
Equation (10) defines the skill threshold below which individuals are working in sector
Y.
4 The open economy
4.1 Profit maximization and export patterns in the open economy
We assume that the domestic country trades with an identical foreign country so that
we need to define the allocations and equilibrium in one country only12. Markets are
segmented because of a variable trade cost τ which includes fret and insurance costs along
with tariffs. As a result, a firm may charge different prices on the domestic and foreign
market. Besides, a firm incurs a fixed export cost F t to start exporting as in Melitz (2003).
F t covers fixed market access costs such as setting up new distribution channels, shipping
requirements as well as ensuring that the firm’s goods conforms to foreign standards and
regulatory environment. The fixed cost generates a selection of firms into exporting as it
is established by the empirical literature. Regardless of the export decision, a firm always
incurs the investment cost Fj . Because this overhead production cost is already incurred,
a firm would not export and not produce for its domestic market. Indeed domestic sells
12Assuming that the trading partner is identical allows to consider only one set of skill thresholds,
slf , slm, shf , shm , which are common to each country. Country differences, for example in the skill dis-
tribution or in the technology, would give rise to different thresholds and equilibrium conditions that vary
across countries.
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yield always strictly higher operating profits compare to sells to foreign markets because
of the additional fixed and variable costs.
The demand for a variety i of the differentiated good comes now from both domestic
and foreign consumers who are assumed to have the same preferences:
xi = p−σi EP σ−1X
xti = (pti)−σEP σ−1X (11)
where pi is the price of variety i on the domestic market and pti is the price of variety i
when it is traded to a foreign market. E is the share of the income spent on goods X. The
price index is now :
PX = (
∑
i
p1−σi +
∑
k
pt1−σk )
1
1−σ
where ptk is the price of variety k traded by a foreign firm and sold on the domestic market.
Firms are subjected to per-unit iceberg trade cost τ . To address the foreign demand, a
firm need to produce qt = τxti as a share τ of the production is required for transportation.
Firms maximize their profits with respect to either price or quantity :
pij = max
pj
{pjqj + It.(ptj
qtj
τ
)− c˜j(qj + Fj + It.(qtj + F t))}
where It equals 1 if the firm exports and qtj = τ(pti)−σEP σ−1X . As marginal costs are
constant, we can separate the profits they earn on each market. The pricing rule in the do-
mestic market implies, exactly as in the autarky case, that the marginal cost of production
equates the marginal revenue.
pj
σ − 1
σ
= c˜j (12)
Firms who export will set higher prices in the foreign markets that reflect the increased
marginal cost due to the transportation cost τ that is completely supported by the consumer
(the standard mill pricing strategy):
ptj
σ − 1
σ
= τ c˜j ⇔ ptj = τpj
The marginal cost of production is still given by wjg(s)ϕ˜jg(s) so that the sorting of workers across
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firms stated in proposition 1 continues to hold, h-firms employ the workers with the highest
skill level.
What are the firms that export ?
Profits of a j-firm that serves only the domestic market are :
pij = c˜j1−σ σ
−σ
(σ−1)1−σEP
σ−1
X − c˜jFj
Profits of a j-firm that serves both markets are :
pitj = c˜j1−σ σ
−σ
(σ−1)1−σEP
σ−1
X (1 + τ1−σ)− c˜j(Fj + F t)
A firm of type j finds it profitable to export if pij ≤ pitj . Three cases arise :
i F tτσ−1 ≥ Fh, no firm export
ii Fl ≤ F tτσ−1 ≤ Fh, h firms only export
iii F tτσ−1 ≤ Fl, both l and h firms export
We can see directly that if there are no fixed cost to export, F t = 0, all firms are
able to export and no level of variable cost τ > 1 can generate the selection of the most
productive firms into exporting. As the differences between exporters and non exporters
-within sectors- are empirically pervasive, it is accepted that models with CES demand
should assume a combination of fixed and variable trade costs to generate a sorting of
firms according to their productivity.
From now on, we focus on the case 2 where only the high-technology firms are able to
export. The free entry conditions determine which workers are employed by exporters. For
h firms, the zero-profit conditions implies :
c˜h = (σ(Fh + F t))
−1
σ ( σ
σ − 1)
1−σ
σ EP σ−1X (1 + τ
1−σ)
1
σ
We denote c˜aj the marginal cost of j firms under autarky. The expected cost per efficient
unit of labour that firms h can pay c˜h is larger under trade, c˜h > c˜ah. This stems from the
increase in market size that benefits to exporting firms.
The zero profit condition for l-firms is :
c˜l = (σFl)
−1
σ ( σ
σ − 1)
1−σ
σ (EP σ−1X )
1
σ
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4.2 The wage distribution in the open economy
Trade openness has an impact on the skill-thresholds that define which type of men
and women are hired by high-tech firms. As before, we can find the skill-threshold to enter
a firm h for by relating the two zero-profit conditions for h and l firms :
c˜h
c˜l
=
(
(Fh + F t)
Fl(1 + τ1−σ)
) 1
σ
From the above equation, we can see that the difference in marginal costs between the
two types of firms is smaller under trade than under autarky, c˜hc˜l <
c˜ah
c˜a
l
.
Using the indifference conditions for the marginal workers of each group whose skill
levels define the skill-threshold, wlg(shg) = whg(shg)⇔ c
t
h
ct
l
= ϕ˜lg(shg)ϕ˜hg(shg) , we have :
Proposition 4. When only h firms export,
i) the skill threshold to enter a firm h is lower under trade compare to the autarky case
for both groups, shg < sahg for g = {l, h}. More workers are matched with a high
technology firms under trade.
ii) the skill threshold to enter a firm h is still higher for women, shm < shf
iii) trade liberalization further reduces the skill requirement for both groups,
∂(c˜h/c˜l)
∂τ > 0⇒
∂shg
∂τ > 0 ∀g
Although the expression for c˜l does not change, its value changes with openness. The
decrease in the skill threshold shg to enter h firms raises wages for the most skill workers;
this in turn raises total income which corresponds to a higher demand for the non-trade
good. This effect will be explicit when the general equilibrium effect is highlighted. Sector
Y thus demands more labour. Consequently, we have a higher skill threshold to enter the
manufacturing industry under trade sl > sal and the marginal production cost of firms l
goes down c˜l < c˜al . Trade openness brings an increase in productivity in the manufacturing
sector along with a higher demand for local services for instance, as a result some workers
move from the manufacturing sector to the non-traded sectors; this is in line with general
employment patterns.
Proposition 5. When only h firms export,
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i) the skill threshold to enter a firm l is higher under trade compare to the autarky case
for both groups, stlg > salg
ii) the skill threshold to enter a firm l is still higher for women, stlm < stlf
iii) the effect of trade liberalization is to further increase the skill threshold above which
workers are employed in the traded sector, ∂(c˜l/cY )∂τ > 0⇒
∂slg
∂τ > 0 ∀g
This is consistent with the stylized fact that the share of manufacturing employment
among women is lower than among men and that trade openness does not reverse that
trend.
The wage function has the same form than under autarcky but the values of the skill
thresholds slg and shg as well as the cost thresholds c˜l and c˜h has changed :
wg(s) =

cY ϕY = 1 if s ≤ slg
c˜lϕ˜lg(s) if slg ≤ s ≤ shg
c˜hϕ˜hg(s) if shg ≤ s
(13)
To measure the changes in the gender wage gap along the skill distribution, we compare
the gap under autarcky with the gaps under openness. The gender wage gap wm(s)wf (s) is now
given by :
WG(s) =

1 if s ≤ slm
c˜l
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕY
if slm ≤ s ≤ slf
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if slf ≤ s ≤ shm
c˜h
c˜l
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if shm ≤ s ≤ shf
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜hf (s) if shf ≤ s
Appendix D makes this result explicit.
Proposition 6. Following trade liberalization,
i) the gender wage gap is reduced at the bottom of the skill distribution as slm > salm
ii) the gender wage gap widens at the top of the distribution given that shm < sahm and
the wage profile is steeper under technology h
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Figure 2: Changes in the gender wage gap with trade openness
4.3 Free-entry and market clearing
In the case where only h firms export and using the free entry condition, the number
of firms is given by :
Nh =
1
σ(Fh + F t)
(
∫
s∈Shf
ϕ˜hf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Shm
ϕ˜hm(s)l(s)ds) (14)
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Nl =
1
σFl
(
∫
s∈Slf
ϕ˜lf (s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Slm
ϕ˜lm(s)l(s)ds) (15)
More workers are hire by h firms under trade as the skill threshold is lower shg >
sahg ∀g.
Finally, the market clearing condition for good Y determines the new skill threshold slm.
Good Y is not traded. The market clearing condition is still given by Y = (1−β)M ,where
M equals total wages in the open economy. Skilled workers’ wages have increased following
trade liberalization as more firms adopt the high-technology. M = ∑g(∫s∈SY g l(s)ds +∫
s∈Slg wlg(s)l(s)ds+
∫
s∈Shg whg(s)l(s)ds).
Using (13) with the new skill thresholds,
M =
∑
g
(
∫ slg
0
l(s)ds+ c˜l
∫ shg
slg
ϕ˜lg(s)l(s)ds+ c˜h
∫ s¯
shg
ϕ˜hg(s)l(s)ds)
Using equation (5) and equalizing demand and production for good Y, we have :
β
1− β ϕ˜l(slm)
∑
g
∫ slg
0
l(s)ds =
∑
g
(∫ shg
slg
ϕ˜lg(s)l(s)ds+
ϕ˜l(shm)
ϕ˜h(shm)
∫ s¯
shg
ϕ˜hg(s)l(s)ds
)
(16)
This equation determines the skill threshold below which individuals are now working
in sector Y and closes the model.
5 Conclusion
This paper offers a theoretical explanation for varying gender wage gap along the skill
distribution and heterogeneous impacts of trade openness on the wage gap depending on
the position along the skill distribution. We need three supermodularity assumptions on
the labour productivity function to give general conditions under which we find the pattern
observed in empirical studies. More precisely we show that if skills and job commitment are
complements to technological upgrading and if skills and job commitment are complements,
statistical discrimination based on job commitment expectations generates a higher gender
wage gap at the upper part of the distribution. The closed economy part of the model thus
puts forward one reason for the glass ceiling effect as well as the increase in residual wage
disparity within gender groups as documented by numerous empirical assessments.
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The analysis also provides insights into the impact of trade openness in a setting with
intra-industry trade and monopolistic competition. First, we show that when trade open-
ness induces technological change biased towards observable and unobservable productive
characteristics, it increases the wage gap at the top of the skill distribution. Second, due
to general equilibrium effects, the gender wage gap is reduced at the lower part of the
distribution.
The paper adds to the understanding of the interactions between the overall wage struc-
ture of an economy and the gender wage gap and can be used to interpret more general
shocks that affect the demand for observable and unobservable characteristics of workers.
It provides a rationale for looking at the contribution of what we call employers’ require-
ment for commitment in shaping gender inequalities.
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A Sorting of heterogeneous workers across firms
We can prove by contradiction, that a high-technology firm hires workers with higher
skill level compare to a low-technology firm
Consider two workers with skill s1 < s2. Let us assume that worker 1 is hired by a firm
h and worker 2 is hired by a firm l.
Firm h pays worker 1 so that its profit is maximized :
σ − 1
σ
ph =
wh(s1)
ϕ˜h(s1)
Firm l pays worker 2 so that its profit is maximized :
σ − 1
σ
pl =
wl(s2)
ϕ˜l(s2)
Firm l would not increase its profit by hiring worker 1 at a wage just above the one
paid by a firm l :
σ − 1
σ
pl ≤ wh(s1)
ϕ˜l(s1)
Firm h would not increase its profit by hiring worker 2 at a wage just above the one
paid by a firm h :
σ − 1
σ
ph ≤ wl(s2)
ϕ˜h(s2)
Equations 1 and 3 implies that plph ≤
ϕ˜h(s1)
ϕ˜l(s1)
Equations 2 and 4 implies that plph ≥
ϕ˜h(s2)
ϕ˜l(s2)
Which implies that ϕ˜h(s2)ϕ˜l(s2) ≤
ϕ˜h(s1)
ϕ˜l(s1) . But this contradicts the assumption that more
skilled workers have a comparative advantage in the high-technology.
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B Ranking of of male and female skill requirements
The indifference condition states that :
ϕ˜hf (shf )
ϕ˜hm(shm)
= ϕ˜lf (shf )
ϕ˜lm(shm)
⇔ ηϕh(shf , e¯) + (1− η)ϕh(sh, e)
ϕh(shm, e¯)
= ηϕl(shf , e¯) + (1− η)ϕh(sh, e)
ϕl(shm, e¯)
That we can rearrange
⇔
η + (1− η)ϕh(shf ,e)ϕh(shf ,e¯)
η + (1− η)ϕl(shf ,e)ϕl(shf ,e¯)
= ϕl(shf , e¯)
ϕl(shm, e¯)
ϕh(shm, e¯)
ϕh(shf , e¯)
Let us prove by contradiction that shf > shm.
Suppose that shf = shm = sh, the condition is now
η + (1− η)ϕh(sh,e)ϕh(sh,e¯)
η + (1− η)ϕl(sh,e)ϕl(sh,e¯)
= ϕl(sh, e¯)
ϕl(sh, e¯)
ϕh(sh, e¯)
ϕh(sh, e¯)
⇔ ϕh(sh, e)
ϕh(sh, e¯)
= ϕl(sh, e)
ϕl(sh, e¯)
Which contradicts the supermodularity assumption between technology and commit-
ment. So that the male and female skill requirements cannot be equal.
Suppose now that shf < shm. By supermodularity between technology upgrading and
skills, we know that :
η + (1− η)ϕh(shf ,e)ϕh(shf ,e¯)
η + (1− η)ϕl(shf ,e)ϕl(shf ,e¯)
< 1
By supermodularity between technology upgrading and skills and the fact that labour
productivity is increasing in skills, we know that:
ϕh(shm, e¯)
ϕh(shf , e¯)
>
ϕl(shm, e¯)
ϕl(shf , e¯)
> 1
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Combining the two we have :
η + (1− η)ϕh(shf ,e)ϕh(shf ,e¯)
η + (1− η)ϕl(shf ,e)ϕl(shf ,e¯)
ϕl(shm, e¯)
ϕl(shf , e¯)
<
ϕh(shm, e¯)
ϕh(shf , e¯)
which contradicts the indifference condition. The female skill requirement to be hired
by a high-tech firm cannot be lower than the male skill requirement.
C Proof of proposition 3: the gender wage gap is increasing
in the level of skills
We explain here under which assumptions the gender wage gap increases with s. The
expression for the wage gap is :
WG(s) =

1 if s ≤ slm
c˜l
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕY
if slm ≤ s ≤ slf
ϕ˜lm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if slf ≤ s ≤ shm
c˜h
c˜l
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) if shm ≤ s ≤ shf
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜hf (s) if shf ≤ s
There is no wage gap between men and women who work in sector Y as labour pro-
ductivity in Y does not depend on either skills or job commitment. This is relevant for
jobs involving routine tasks. When the workers’ skill levels are comprised between slm and
slf , the wage gap equals c˜l ϕ˜lm(s)ϕY which is greater than 1 and increasing in s from (A1).
For that part to be increasing in s, we actually need that technology l features stronger
complementarities with skills compare to the technology used in sector Y .
When ϕ is supermodular in skills and technology upgrading (A2), c˜hc˜l
ϕ˜hm(s)
ϕ˜lf (s) is increasing
in s.
The supermodularity of ϕ in skills and commitment (A4) ensures that the ratios ϕ˜lm(s)ϕ˜lf (s)
and ϕ˜hm(s)ϕ˜hf (s) are increasing in s.
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D Proof of proposition 5 on the changes in the gender wage
gap with trade openness
How has the gender wage gap changed compare to the autarky case? Changes in the
gender wage gap WG(s)WGa(s) are non-linear in s.
For s ∈ [0; salm], there is no wage gap under either trade or autarky.
For s ∈ [salm; slm], WG(s)WGa(s) = 1c˜a
l
ϕ˜lm(s) , the wage gap is lower under trade as more men are
employed in sector Y where there is no wage gap.
For s ∈ [slm; salf ], WG(s)WGa(s) = c˜lc˜al , the wage gap is lower under trade as the unit cost of
l-firms has decreased.
For s ∈ [salf ; slf ], WG(s)WGa(s) = c˜lϕ˜lf (s) , the wage gap is higher under trade.
For s ∈ [slf ; shm], the wage gap is of the same magnitude under trade and autarky.
For s ∈ [shm; sahm], WG(s)WGa(s) = c˜hϕ˜hm(s)c˜lϕ˜lm which is greater than 1 as sorting implies that
c˜hϕ˜hm(s) > c˜lϕ˜lm for s > shm. The wage gap is higher under trade.
For s ∈ [sahm; shf ], WG(s)WGa(s) = c˜hc˜ah
c˜l
c˜a
l
, the wage gap is higher under trade.
For s ∈ [shf ; sahf ], WG(s)WGa(s) = ϕ˜hm(s)ϕ˜lm which is greater than 1. The wage gap has increased
with trade.
For s ∈ [sahf ; s¯], WG(s)WGa(s) = 1
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